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Abstract 
This research examines the question of whether the psychology of social identity can be 
extended to enhance cooperative motives in the context of very large, global collectives.   
Our data come from a multi-national study of choice behavior in a multi-level public goods 
dilemma conducted among samples drawn from the general populations of the United States, 
Italy, Russia, Argentina, South Africa and Iran.   Results demonstrate that an inclusive social 
identification with the world community is a meaningful psychological construct that plays a role 
in motivating cooperation that transcends parochial interests. Self-reported identification with the 
world as a whole predicts behavioral contributions to a global public good above and beyond 
expectations about what other participants are likely to contribute. Furthermore, global social 
identification is conceptually distinct from general attitudes about global issues, with unique 
effects on cooperative behavior. 
 Keywords:  Social identity, cooperation, social dilemma, goal transformation, 
globalization 
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Global Social Identity and Global Cooperation 
 
More than ever before in human history, many of our most pressing problems involve 
global interdependence.  Because of phenomena associated with global warming, destruction of 
rainforests, and instability in international markets, decisions made by actors in one locality have 
consequences for the physical environment and economic opportunities of people at remote 
distances.  Addressing such problems requires cooperation that transcends national boundaries. 
Many global problems are social dilemmas – situations in which individuals must choose 
between behaviors serving self-interest and behaviors benefitting the collective welfare.  At each 
dilemma decision point, it is in the individual’s interest to act selfishly, but if everyone acts self-
interestedly, ultimately everyone in the collective is worse off (Dawes, 1980; Messick & Brewer, 
1983).  The public goods dilemma exemplifies this situation.  Public goods depend on individual 
contributions to be created, but once created, the public good is available to all members of a 
collective regardless of their level of contribution.  Thus, each individual maximizes self interest 
by benefitting from the resource without contributing anything.  But if everyone in the collective 
fails to contribute, the public good is lost, benefitting no one. Collectively, everyone is better off 
if all contribute, even though cooperation involves self-sacrifice at the individual level. 
Public goods dilemmas have been studied extensively by behavioral economists, political 
scientists, and social psychologists, and laboratory and field research is instructive about the 
conditions under which individuals will behave cooperatively even when contributing resources 
to a group of anonymous strangers. In general, when shared group identity is made salient, or 
when group members are strongly identified with the collective, levels of cooperation are 
significantly higher than when no shared identity is available or group identification is weak 
(e.g,. DeCremer & van Vugt, 1999; Wit & Kerr, 2002). 
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Although a number of mechanisms have been proposed to explain why social 
identification with the relevant collective enhances self-sacrificial cooperation on behalf of that 
group (Brewer, 2008); we focus on two that have received the most attention—expectancies and 
values.  
Expectations about Others                                                                                                                                 
One theory is based upon the general expectancy that others will be cooperative within 
the ingroup (Brewer, 1986; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000), that others cooperate with me because 
we are members of the same group (Foddy, Platow & Yamagishi, 2009).  Such norms of 
“generalized reciprocity” are strong in intra-group interactions and weaker or absent across 
group boundaries (Tanis and Postmes, 2005; Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999).  Expecting that 
others will behave cooperatively reduces the fear that one’s own cooperation will be taken 
advantage of, making cooperation compatible with individual incentives.  Thus, it is tempting to 
believe that if ingroup membership increases trust (i.e., expectations that other ingroup members 
will cooperate), this is sufficient to account for the effect of ingroup identity on all intragroup 
cooperative behavior.  
However, expectations of others’ intentions to cooperate are not of themselves sufficient 
to generate cooperative behavior, especially in large, dispersed groups (e.g., De Cremer, Dewitte, 
& Snyder, 2001). Although trust reduces fear, it does not eliminate the self-interested benefit of 
noncooperation (greed).  If everyone else is expected to cooperate, noncooperation takes 
advantage of others’ contributions to group welfare and maximizes personal outcomes.  In very 
large collectives, where monitoring and sanctioning of nonreciprocity are minimal, this 
temptation to take advantage of others’ cooperation is great.    
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Goal Transformation 
A second explanation is that strengthening group identity increases the value people 
attach to the group’s welfare as opposed to their personal welfare. When individuals attach their 
sense of self to their group membership, they see themselves as interchangeable components of a 
larger social unit (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). As a result of this re-
definition of the self, pursuing the group’s interest and concern with the group’s welfare 
becomes a direct expression of self-interest, that is, collective and personal interest are 
interchangeable (Brewer, 1991; De Cremer and Van Vugt, 1999; Kramer & Brewer, 1986).  
De Cremer and van Dijk (2002) tested this idea in the context of a multiple round public 
goods dilemma.  Notification that their group had failed to provide the public good in the earlier 
round motivated strong social identity participants to contribute significantly more in the session 
following feedback, consistent with the goal-transformation hypothesis. In contrast, weak group 
identifiers reduced their contributions in the second round, as would be predicted based on 
expectations about other group members’ behavior. 
Prior research on social identity and collective cooperation has involved relatively small 
laboratory groups or local communities.  Extant theories of the origins of altruistic cooperation in 
humans suggest that large-scale cooperation is parochial in nature (e.g., Bernhard, Fischbacher, 
& Fehr, 2006; Choi & Bowles, 2007), and biased in favor of ingroups such as ethnic groups, 
nations, or religious communities. This leaves open the question of whether social identity can 
enhance cooperation in the context of very large, global collectives. The current study examines 
the influence of social identity on behavior in a multi-level public goods dilemma where 
participants choose whether to make contributions that benefit the self, a local group, or a 
worldwide group. 
Page 5 of 24 Manuscript under review for Psychological Science
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
GLOBAL SOCIAL IDENITY AND GLOBAL COOPERATION                                          6 
 
The study was conducted in six countries representing high variability in environmental 
factors.  The US, Italy, Argentina, South Africa, Russia and Iran differ greatly in levels of social, 
economic and political globalization, as measured by the aggregated country-level globalization 
index (CGI) 1 produced by the Centre for the Study of Globalization and Regionalisation at the 
University of Warwick, UK2.  Furthermore, our sample was drawn from the general population 
of each country - men and women, aged 18-75 representing all levels of social economic status - 
providing high variability in demographic factors.  
The first study from this research (Buchan et al. 2009) demonstrated that contributions to 
the worldwide group varied across countries as a function of the level of country-wide or 
individual-level globalization in each nation, such as the level of social connectivity via internet 
connections, or economic connectivity via trade or purchase of foreign products. At both the 
country and individual level, higher globalization was associated with greater contribution to a 
world collective.  In the present study we examine whether there are psychological variables that 
are robust in predicting individual cooperative behaviors across this variation in social and 
economic conditions in our research population. 
 More specifically, the goals of the present research are, first, to demonstrate empirically 
the existence of an identification with the world at large that transcends parochial interests in 
motivating cooperation in a global public goods dilemma, and second, to test whether the 
influence of global social identity on cooperation exists independently of the effect of 
expectations concerning how others in the world collective will behave.   
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Method 
The Sample 
Within each country the research was conducted in a large metropolitan area and in 
surrounding areas that were less globalized in nature. For example, in Russia the research 
occurred in Kazan, a globalized city in Tatarstan, and in more rural outposts.  The metropolitan 
area in the United States was Columbus, Ohio; in South Africa, Johannesburg; in Italy, Milan; in 
Argentina, Buenos Aires, and in Iran, Tehran.  
A quota sampling recruitment method was used based on three characteristics: gender; 
age (18- 30, 31-50, 51-75); socioeconomic status (low, medium, high).  These characteristics 
produced an 18 cell matrix, yielding approximately 190 participants per country for a total of 
1195 participants. The implementation of standardized experimental instructions and procedures 
in each country ensured the cross-country comparability of the datasets.  All participants 
possessed at least a 4th grade reading level, had lived in the locality for at least one year, and 
were citizens of the country studied.3 
Experimental Paradigm 
Individual propensities to cooperate with local and global others were assessed in a 
Multi-level Sequential Contribution (MSC) experiment. The MSC protocol resembles that of a 
standard multi-level public goods experiment (Blackwell & McKee, 2003; Wit & Kerr, 2002).   
The full experiment consisted of three contribution decisions-- the local, national, and global 
public goods.  In the current research we focused only on the local and global (world) decision 
data4.  For each decision participants were given 10 tokens.  One token was worth the purchasing 
power equivalent of US $0.50.   
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The experiment was conducted with a maximum of 24 and a minimum of four 
participants per session.  Privacy barriers were constructed between participants so that their 
choices would not be influenced by observing what others were doing. At each session’s start, 
participants were told that they would be making decisions with other people, some of whom 
were from their local community (but perhaps not currently in the room), some from elsewhere 
in the same country, and some from other countries.  Furthermore, some participants may have 
already made their decisions; the participant’s choices and the choices of others would be 
matched by computer at the end of the session and payoffs would be determined.  
Because of the logistical impossibility of conducting the experiment simultaneously in 
six countries, we relied on a dynamic matching algortithm where past participants’ decisions 
were used to determine the payoffs of current participants whose own decisions entered the 
dataset as the experiment ensued. By this method, participants’ outcomes were determined by 
their decision and those made by arbitrarily selected groups of participants from the participant’s 
locality, country, or other countries around the world.  Participants received payoffs at the end of 
the experiment, thus no feedback was provided regarding decisions during the session. 
In the Local Decision, participants faced the same incentives as in a standard public 
goods game.  This two-choice decision familiarized participants with the experimental task and 
established baseline levels of cooperation. In the Local Decision, participants decided how to 
allocate tokens between their “personal” and “local” accounts.  Each token put into the personal 
account was saved and worth a single token.  Each token put into the local account was doubled 
by the experimenter and shared equally between the participant and three other (anonymous) 
participants from the same local area. Likewise, the participant received an equal share from the 
tokens that the other three local participants put into their local accounts. Therefore, the return to 
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each individual for each token allocated to the local account – the Marginal Per Capita Return 
(MPCR) - was 0.5. In contrast, the return to the group – the marginal social return (MSR) - 
equaled 2. A selfish individual would allocate all their tokens to their personal account because 
of its larger return relative to the collective account. Were all individuals selfish, each participant 
would keep their initial 10 tokens. In contrast, were all individuals of a group to allocate their 
endowment to their local accounts, this would result in a 20 token payoff tokens to each group 
member. 
After the instructions were read, participants worked several example decisions to make 
sure they understood the nature of the task and the effects of their own and others’ choices on 
their outcomes.   Finally, participants made their actual allocations by putting red tokens into 
envelopes labeled PERSONAL and LOCAL.  An experiment assistant collected the envelopes 
took them into the control room where the tokens were recorded in the algorithm and payoffs 
calculated.   
 In the World Decision participants chose how much to allocate among their personal 
account, their local account and their “world” account.  The structure of incentives of the 
personal and local accounts was identical to that of the Local Decision. Tokens placed in the 
World account were instead tripled by the experimenter and split equally among a “world” group 
of 12 people.  The world group was made up of the participant, a new group of three 
(anonymous) local people benefiting from the local account – plus two groups of four people 
from different countries. Participants were not told which specific countries these other 
participants were from, but were informed that these countries were from any of the four 
continents where the research was being conducted.   Each participant received a one-twelfth 
share of the allocations that all twelve people made to their world accounts.  
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The MPCR from allocations to the world account equals .25; less than the MPCR from 
the Local account, .50. In contrast, the MSR of contributions to the World account equals 3.0; 
larger than the MSR of the Local account, 2.0. Consequently, if all individuals allocated their 
endowment to their World account in the World Decision, this would result in a larger payoff (30 
tokens) to each participant than if all allocated their endowment to their local accounts (20 
tokens). This structure of incentives characterizes a multi-level public goods dilemma.  A 
contribution to a higher-order public good typically benefits a larger number of people but at a 
smaller rate of return than a contribution to a lower-order public good.   
Again participants completed several example decisions to be certain they understood the 
nature of the nested global public good.  Participants then made their allocations by putting 
yellow tokens into envelopes labeled PERSONAL, LOCAL and WORLD and the envelopes 
were collected.   
Expectancy Measure 
 After completing all allocation decisions, participants answered questions regarding their 
expectations of group members’ cooperative behavior.  Each participant was asked how many 
tokens they believed their fellow members in the Local group allocated to the Local account in 
the Local Decision.  For example:  
In Decision 1 you had 10 red tokens.  So did everyone else.  You could put your tokens into your 
“Personal” envelope or into your Kazan envelope.  The other three people in your local group 
could also choose to put tokens into their own personal envelope or into the Kazan envelope. 
Please answer the following question. 
 
How much do you think the other three people put into the Kazan envelopes in total 
(there is a maximum of 30 red tokens that they could put into them):  ______________ 
 
Then on a separate form they were asked how many tokens they believed their fellow 
members in the Local group allocated to the Local account in the World Decision and how many 
Page 10 of 24Manuscript under review for Psychological Science
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
GLOBAL SOCIAL IDENITY AND GLOBAL COOPERATION                                          11 
 
tokens their fellow members in the World group allocated to the World account in the World 
Decision.    
This type of expectancy measure is a common operationalization of trust with the 
expectancy assessment coming after the contribution decision has been made.  Because of this, 
any relationship between trust and cooperation is causally ambiguous; it is possible that 
individuals are projecting their own choices onto fellow group members or using expectations to 
justify previous actions (Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977).  For this reason, we assessed 
expectancies about earlier decisions after some delay.   Despite this, we assume that the 
relationship between an individual’s own contribution decision and their reported expectancies 
about others’ contributions is a mutually reciprocal one.  
Questionnaire Measures 
Participants next completed a questionnaire prior to receiving their payoffs.  Responses to 
this questionnaire provided data for our measures of social identity, concern for global issues, a 
globalization index used in other phases of this research, as well as basic demographic 
information on participant sex, age, education, and income level5. 
Social Identity.  A three-item measure assessed social identification at the levels of the 
local community, the nation, and the world.  For example, in Kazan, Russia these items read: 
“How strongly do you feel attachment to your community in Kazan?” “How strongly do you feel 
attachment to your community in Russia?” How strongly do you feel attachment to the world as 
a whole?” “How strongly do you define yourself as a member of your community in Kazan?”  
“in Russia,” “… of the world as a whole?”  “How close do you feel to other members of your 
community in Kazan?”   “… in Russia,””…  to the world as a whole?”  Each item was Likert-
scaled from 1 to 4 where 4=very much and 1= not at all.   
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The Cronbach alpha of the three social identity items was .78 at the local level, .72 at the 
national level, and .75 at the world level.  The social identification scale at each level (Local 
Social Identity, (LSI), National Social Identity, (NSI), and Global Social Identity, (GSI)) was 
summated with all three items equally weighted, resulting in possible scores ranging from 3 to 
12.   
Concern for Global Issues.  Since identification is expected to be associated with values 
that include concern for global welfare, a measure of concern was included in the questionnaire, 
composed of four items.  Participants were asked, “How concerned are you with the following 
issues: “Global warming,” “The spread across the planet of potentially dangerous diseases (e.g. 
HIV, SARS, Bird flu),” “Making the action of International Criminal Courts of Justice more 
effective,” “The persistent gap between rich and poor people around the world”.  Each item was 
scaled from 1 to 4 where 4=Very concerned and 1= Not at all concerned.   Again the items were 
summed and equally weighted to form the Concern variable (Cronbach’s α=.64).      
Results 
Of the 1145 participants in the study, there were complete dependent variables (that is, 
contribution data for both the Local and World accounts) for 1122. Among these 1122 
individuals, missing questionnaire data occurred  randomly across people and countries.  To 
address this we used PROC MI, a multiple imputation procedure in SAS, to represent a random 
sample of the missing values (Rubin 1996).   
Cross-national comparisons 
Table 1 provides basic descriptive statistics from our sample across countries on the key 
measures of interest; contributions to the world account, expectations about others’ contributions 
to the world account, global social identity (GSI), and concern for global issues.  The countries 
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are listed on the table in ascending order of their country level globalization (CGI).  Given the 
differences among countries in globalization and also in mean levels of predictor variables, 
country was always included as a control variable in analyses of individual level effects.6 
------------------------------------------- Insert Table 1 about here -------------------------------------
Intercorrelations  
The individual level intercorrelations between world contributions, expectations, concern, 
and all levels of social identity are shown in Table 2.  As expected, there is a high and significant 
correlation between world contributions and expectations, consistent with the hypothesized 
reciprocal relationship between the two measures.7  We also see the predicted significant 
relationship between concern for global issues and global social identity (GSI), both of which are 
correlated with world contributions.   Despite the significant intercorrelations among the social 
identity measures, only the measure of global social identity has a significant bivariate 
correlation with world contributions.  
------------------------------------------- Insert Table 2 about here ------------------------------------- 
Regression Analysis 
 At the heart of our analysis is the prediction of world contributions from GSI, concern, 
and expectations, controlling for country (dummy coded), demographic variables, baseline 
cooperation (local contributions) and local and national identity.  The results of this regression 
are shown in Table 3.  As anticipated, expectation is the most important variable in the model, 
affirming the reciprocal relationship between expectation of cooperative behavior and 
contributions. Importantly however, GSI does have a significant independent effect on global 
cooperation, above and beyond the effect of expectation, even after the influences of income, 
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education, baseline cooperation, local and national identity and country have been accounted 
for.8   
------------------------------------------- Insert Table 3 about here ------------------------------------- 
Furthermore, although concern is correlated with world contributions, it is not a 
significant predictor of contributions when GSI and expectations are included in the model, 
supporting the contention that social identification has unique effects on cooperative behavior, 
distinct from general attitudes about global issues.  
Discussion 
The results from this multi-nation study suggest that an inclusive social identification 
with the world community is a meaningful psychological construct and that it plays a role in 
motivating cooperation that transcends parochial interests. Importantly, self-reported 
identification with the world as a whole predicts behavioral contributions to a global public good 
independent of expectations about what other participants in the group are likely to contribute.  
Although individuals high in global identification did generally have positive expectations about 
others’ contributions, the size of their own contributions was systematically higher than what 
would be predicted from expectations alone. This is in line with the hypothesized mechanism of 
goal transformation; global social identity is associated with a desire to maximize collective 
outcomes and  motivates individuals to contribute to collective goods regardless of whether they 
expect a return on their investment or not.   
Although our empirical evidence for the role of global social identity in motivating global 
cooperation is purely correlational, the present study has the strength of a behavioral outcome 
measure.  Participants in this study who described themselves as identified with the world 
community literally “put their money where their mouth is” in making decisions to contribute 
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significant resources at potential cost to personal wealth.  The monetary outcomes in the 
experiment were not trivial; across the three decision tasks participants had the potential to 
acquire the purchasing power equivalent of $40 U.S. or more, depending on what they and others 
contributed to the collective accounts.  Yet for each token that an individual contributed to the 
world account, he/she could only count on receiving .25 as their share of the collective good; 
choosing to contribute was a risky choice that sacrificed self-interest while increasing the 
collective wealth.  Further, the nature of our sample – taken from the general population of six 
countries from around the world – is unique and adds to the external validity of our findings.  
Our participants – men and women ranging in age from 18 to 75 - represented a broad spectrum 
of levels of socio and economic status in countries that themselves ranged widely in aggregate 
levels of economic, social, and political globalization.   
Across this range of countries and participant characteristics, self-reported identification 
with the world as a whole emerged as a unique predictor of size of contributions to a global 
collective. Such social identity-based cooperation is particularly important for large groups 
facing public goods dilemmas.  In the absence of close monitoring and sanctioning of 
noncooperation, some basis for intrinsic motivation to cooperate and contribute to the group 
welfare is essential. Cooperation that does not depend exclusively on reciprocal trust may be 
required to solve global social dilemmas under conditions where well-developed group norms, 
mutual recognition of shared group identity, and group sanctions for noncooperation are absent. 
Symbolic identification with “the world as a whole” may serve to generalize the psychology of 
ingroup behavior to a more inclusive collective that transcends the requirement of defined group 
boundaries. 
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1
  The countries have the following CGI scores (on a 0-1 scale): Iran .1996, South Africa .3398. 
Argentina .3839, Russia .6020. Italy .6722, USA .8700.   
2
  See Lockwood B, Redoano M (2005) http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/index/ 
3
   Further detailed description of the sampling, procedures, experimental materials, and all 
instruments used in this research is available at 
http://www.pnas.org/content/suppl/2009/03/01/0809522106.DCSupplemental/Appendix_PDF.pdf 
4
   Contributions to the nation collective in Decision 2 were highly correlated with size of 
contributions to the global collective in Decision 3 (r = .68, p < .01).  In general, individuals who 
made sizeable contributions at the global level also did so at the national level, but not 
necessarily vice versa.  Accounting for differences between national and global collective 
contributions was beyond the scope of the present study. 
5
   Income denotes the income decile to which a participant responded s/he belongs within his/her 
country’s income distribution; it is a country-specific measure. 
6
   Country was entered as five dummy coded variables (with the U.S. as the baseline case), so 
analyzing interaction terms would have added five more variables to the model. Exploring the 
regression results within each country, the effect of global identity was positive in every case. 
The size of the effect did vary from country to country, but in no systematic manner 
(specifically, did not vary systematically with country level globalization).   
7
   However in at least three countries, the average expectation of others’ contributions was 
substantially higher than the mean of own contributions, suggesting that, for some participants at 
least, trust in others’ generosity provided an opportunity for exploitation rather than 
reciprocation. 
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8
   The variables of gender and age were shown not to contribute significantly in prior models 
predicting world contribution.   Therefore, gender and age were left out of the model in this 
analysis.   
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Table 1      
      
Means and Standard Deviations for Primary Measures:  Cross-National Comparisons 
            
Country   Primary Measure   Mean SD  
       
IRAN  World Contributions  3.42 2.81  
(N=179)  Expectation   3.06 3.23  
  GSI   6.63 2.12  
    Concern    2.57 0.88  
SOUTH 
AFRICA  World Contributions  3.81 1.98 
 
(N=159)  Expectation   3.73 2.77  
  GSI   7.88 2.76  
    Concern    2.81 0.84  
ARGENTINA  World Contributions  3.81 2.84  
(N=201)  Expectation   5.19 2.80  
  GSI   7.24 2.57  
    Concern    2.84 0.75  
RUSSIA  World Contributions  4.70 2.66  
(N=207)  Expectation   5.89 2.79  
  GSI   7.85 2.47  
    Concern    2.52 0.79  
ITALY  World Contributions  4.49 2.87  
(N=205)  Expectation   5.15 2.71  
  GSI   8.89 2.01  
    Concern    2.76 0.74  
USA  World Contributions  5.79 3.16  
(N=171)  Expectation   5.78 2.75  
  GSI   8.29 2.35  
    Concern    2.97 0.85  
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Table 2                                                      
       
Intercorrelations among World Contributions, Expectations, Social Identity (Global, National 
and Local), and Concern   (N=1122)     
  
World 
Contributions Expectation GSI NSI LSI Concern 
World 
Contributions       
Expectation .53***      
GSI .20*** .17***     
NSI 0.00 0.00 .41***    
LSI -0.02 -0.01 .29*** .53***   
Concern  .09** .09** .25*** .13*** .13***   
**p<.05. ***p<.01.      
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Table 3     
     
Prediction of World Contribution with Control Variablesa   
    β t(1122) p 
     
Income  .05 1.84 .07 
Education  .04 1.60 .11 
Local Contribution  .33 13.45 .00 
Concern  .01 0.53 .59 
LSI  -.02 -0.86 .39 
NSI  -.01 -0.35 .72 
GSI  .09 3.35 .00 
Expectation (Global)  .41 16.27 .00 
R
2
   42     
a
Regression values after including country dummy codes as control variables 
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